Die Linke in Germany

Perhaps the most unpleasant development in German politics has been the relatively recent rise of the Linkspartei, particularly after the German elections two months ago. This article from the Weekly Standard articulates many of the sentiments that many Germans of the non-Communist persuasion fear.

The article, however, fails to fully explain the makeup of die Linke. It is certainly true that it represents a continuity with the SED, and its Communist fellow-travelers. However, it is not merely an East German party; in the former West Germany, it eventually merged with the Wahlalternative, formed when a far-left Social Democrat named Oskar Lafontaine decided that Gerhard Schröder was too Marktwirtschaft and not Sozial(istische) enough for the German "Sozialmarktwirtschaft."

As a result, the Linkspartei is a Germany-wide party. Up until the last election, most academic literature identified it as a protest party (in which voters cast a vote not so much for the party itself, but against the dominant parties, in this case the SPD), yet its strong showing in the October elections will almost certainly force a reëvaluation of German politics. The lack of support for the the SPD, with its defense of a Sozialmarktwirtschaft, should send slight shivers down the spine of those who fear an insurrection by parties less inclined to legitimize a prosperous and market-oriented Germany. If the SPD, which traditionally claims to represent union-member interests in the German corporatist model, loses much of its union base, it could have divisive results for Germany throughout its economy. This would increase the tension between labor and management, and thus creating a more contentious form of politics, leading possibly to more strikes and a more cautious attitude on the part of those who would invest in Germany.

On the other hand, Gerald Robbins is correct when he notes that die Linke is possibly enjoying a mere fleeting popularity. Die Linke's strong showing vis-a-vis the Greens, for the past 20 years considered the junior party of the legitimate German Left, cannot be a positive sign for German democracy; however, it is clear that pocketbook issues dominated the German elections, much as they did in the US a year ago. In a policy environment where climate change takes a back seat to job security, one cannot be surprised that the environmental movement received short shrift with a public far more concerned with building Opels than with what comes out of an Opel's exhaust pipe. It cannot be expected that German voters will continue to flock to protest parties if the greatest concern that voters have is climate change, when the Green Party exists as a viable avenue for expressing a desire for increased government involvement.

Perhaps the most worrisome trend is the emergence of Länder in which die Linke has ended up in coalitions, such as in Berlin and Brandenburg (both in the former East Germany). After the 2009 Landtag elections in the Saarland (where Lafontaine is from and enjoys a great deal of personal support), it was also possible that die Linke would emerge as a coalition partner, but the CDU, FDP, and the Greens teamed up to form an uneasy "Jamaika-Koalition" to head off a coalition in which the Linkspartei would be a dominant force. After Lafontaine's retirement, however, it will be interesting to see if die Linke can retain support in this region. Nevertheless, a coalition with the former SED has now become a legitimized political possibility, though the SPD continues to officially promise not to cooperate with the Linkspartei at the federal level. However, if the SPD's fortunes continue to wane, they may have little choice.

Part of the reason for the current black-yellow coalition is undoubtedly due to the current factionalism of the German Left, but it is also unlikely that this situation will remain like this for long. The German Left will eventually tactically consolidate or the SPD will re-absorb its disaffected voters. In either case, the German Right cannot simply rest on its currect (relative) unity. The key question will be whether the German Left is commited to purging its (ex?)-communists, and marginalizing them similar to the way neo-Nazi parties in Germany are, or integrating them into the SPD, thus pulling it dangerously close to a less democratic party than the SPD has been for the last 140 years.

In this way, the Germans are still adjusting to the fall of the Wall 20 years ago. It will take at least another 20 years before an honest assessment of the communist SED and its legacy are possible.