A journal of political, social, and other important, possibly even somewhat related affairs, including but not limited to: Central European Society, The European Union, HC Kometa Brno, American Politics, Film, and Beer.

19 October 2012

"Pomazánkové máslo" in the EU

The EU's Court of Justice has ruled that the Czechs can no longer call pomazánkové máslo "pomazánkové máslo." The reason is that there's not much butter -- máslo -- in it. As this article explains, it's considerably less than 80% butter, and indeed, it's not really like butter at all; it tastes more like cream cheese or sour cream than butter. It's white, softer easier to spread on bread, tastes nothing like butter, and comes in a little tub. In other words, it's NOT butter, and it's pretty obvious it's not. According to this article from the extraordinarily reputable Aha, pomazánkové máslo was invented in 1977, when one dairy took cream, homogenized it, and let it get just a little sour. Everybody loved it, so it became a fixture in Czech fridges, where it's been there ever since. Your correspondent, in fact, has one tub in the back of the fridge dating back to 2009, for example. 

Fortunately, the valiant knights in Brussels protecting us from the frightening threat of confusing labels have relieved us of trying to figure out whether it's really butter or not. They bought a tub or two of it, found out it wasn't butter -- SHOCK! -- and directed their energies to helping teach the poor Czechs about this fact. In theory, if it's exported to another country, they would *have* to translate the label, and the label would *have* to be translated as *spreadable butter,*  and that could confuse Polish and Austrian people, (who, to be fair, can be easily confused). Czechs had hoped to get an exception to the rule, but the Wise Valiant Court ruled against the tyrannical milkmen.

In the US, Congress has the power to regulate "interstate" commerce; in the EU, a court decides whether or not something that's intended for domestic consumption that's not butter can have the word "butter" in it. One Czech Europol sums it up in the article: "We have a common market of 500 million customers, so there have to be certain rules, regulations and definitions. So if the rule for butter is that milkfat content has to be at least 80%, it is clear that you cannot call something butter which has only 30% fat content. So I think the verdict is clear and fair." It doesn't matter that it's not available for export, or that customers are likely going to be at least as frustrated and confused by the change as by the bureaucratic decision. But the most frustrating part is the arrogance of the overall situation, and the hostility to normalcy. It's always "YOU have to change, YOU have to pay for it, and it's not OUR problem..... Aren't you glad we're keeping you from being exploited?" While it's certainly important for health and safety that pomazánkové máslo should be free of bugs and rat-tails and things of this nature, it impossible to see how these sorts of decisions serve any possible conception of the public interest in the real world. The privileging of the perfect system over messy reality wins out again. The Court takes one particular use of one particular word -- bear in mind "pomazánkové máslo" has never been sold, marketed, or considered by anyone (except for tourists who can't read Czech anyway) as a substitute or a replacement for "máslo" butter -- and decides it knows better than Czechs themselves about the meaning of a phrase in a language it can't even read.

No word at press time on whether apple butter, Lachsschinken (definitely not made from salmon), strawberry lip gloss, American Vollkorn-Sandwich bread (no doubt made from real Americans, in America!), condoms with tea tree oil, or shampoo with shea butter are the next targets of the Knights.

15 October 2012

A Little Context on the Czech Elections

This article from the Financial Times discusses the recent electoral fortunes of the KSČM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) in regional and Senate elections, and points out correctly that the unreformed party garnered 20% of the votes nationwide. This is undoubtedly a problem, but it is more of a flaring up of a chronic problem then a dramatic new shift in thinking in Czech politics, and least with respect to the KSČM. First, there are regional disparities of where the Left did particularly well; second, there is the general issue of low turnout; finally, there is the issue of many more people voting for a variety of small parties, very few of which cleared the 5% hurdle to enter the regional assemblies.
 
15% for the Communists is "normal" in the Czech Republic, and the place where KSČM did best, around Ústí nad Labem, is a place where unemployment is high, and everybody who could move away for better work has probably already done so. The people left in these areas are usually not known for entrepreneurial enthusiasm or strong commitment to the free market system. Indeed, these old industrial regions are places that have had trouble throughout the post-November* ('89) era; after the change, people realized that ugly inefficient factories that produced a bunch of stuff nobody wanted would be difficult to privatize. The Communists' victory around Karlovy Vary (Carlsbad) is perhaps more surprising, but the Communists won "only" 23% of the votes, and so the margin of victory over the Social Democrats (ČSSD) ends up meaning only one seat in the assembly. The biggest question overhanging this region concerns the total collapse of ODS since 2004-2008, when it had an absolute majority in the assembly, to now, when it can barely scrape together enough votes to enter.

Still, while the Communists increased their share of the vote across the country, it frequently came at the expense of the Social Democrats as well as ODS, (the Civic Democrats). Low turnout overall tends to benefit small parties, and there is a huge level of general disgust with the level of corruption both real and imagined on the part of ODS and ČSSD. For "normal" people, disgust at the political scene dissuades them from voting; for the ever-mobilized unemployed and geriatrics that constitute KSČM's electorate, disgust motivates them. Nationwide, voting saw about 35-40% turnout; this further amplifies the Communists' share.

The final observation concerns the growth of other small parties and coalitions. While the unpopular (if necessary) measures undertaken by the rightish coalition in Prague have hurt ODS at the polls, one of their coalition partners, TOP 09, actually saw much of its influence grow at the regional level, albeit not on the level that KSČM enjoyed. 

The Left in Czech Republic is undoubtedly running with momentum now, and it remains to be seen if ČSSD will abandon its agreement never to work with the Communists. However, it is also the case that this will be a wake-up call to the current coalition parties to explain why their austerity programs are necessary and what benefits Czechs will see in the long run. It also sends a message that at some point, Czechs are willing to through their lot in with KSČM (which is hardly a clean-hands party itself) if the others don't start purging their own crooked people. 

It's going to be an ugly next couple years.




*"Polistopadová" literally translates as "after November," but for Czechs, it's perfectly obvious which November they are referring to. 

13 October 2012

2012 Nobel Prize

The Nobel Committee has announced that the EU is the recipient of the 2012 Peace Prize, and in a year where peace has been hard to come by (and it would look a bit presumptuous to give it to President Obama again so soon, even after all his peacemaking successes), they had to give it to somebody. 

There are, I suppose, two ways to look at the Prize, either as a "You had a great year" award or as a "Lifetime Achievement Award." Obviously, it hasn't been the former, unless you somehow believe that the rise of neo-Fascist parties in Greece (Golden Dawn) and the UK (the BNP), and the strengthening of Communist parties in Greece, Czech Republic, and Italy contribute to peace. Indeed, one of the few ways one could interpret the conferral of the Peace Prize on the EU in this way would be to give it a sort of confidence boost, a cheering up from those plucky Norwegians (who themselves must be sighing with relief about not being in the eurozone). When Angela Merkel is greeted with Hakenkreuze and jackboots by an impoverished Athens in which men in suits root through garbage, the goal of economic peace the EU so desperately crafted can only be interpreted ironically. The EU's decades-long attempts to create a space of peace, freedom, prosperity, and solidarity themselves have revealed how little individuals in European nations agree on the meaning of those terms, and giving the prize to the European Union at the very moment the Union is at its most fragile since it renamed itself the "Union" is a gesture of hope, rather than an expression of realistic assessment.

As a Lifetime Achievement Award, the EU perhaps fares better, though in this way it signals that the rest of the world has run out of peacemakers for the time being. (Maybe leading from behind wasn't such a good idea after all.) Your correspondent writes from the train at this time, speeding past Weimar, earlier smoothly following the Elbe, crossing the border from Bohemia to Saxony without even waking. European efforts to facilitate commerce and cultural and educational exchange have helped to make Europe smaller than ever before. (Of course, this integration would not have been possible without NATO quietly resting in Europe's foreign policy holster, and it's hardly a coincidence that European integration has only accelerated since the end of the Cold War.) And it is certainly true that the European Union has rewarded the development of democracy on its doorstep, albeit tolerant only of a very specific type of "blue social model" welfare state. 

One question, of course, is whether or not its promotion of democratic governance does anything for people who live in the dictatorships on Europe's periphery. In the 90's, democratic Europeans wanted to return to democratic Europe; Europeans that weren't simply ignored the Union, and they still do. 

Internally, certainly the EU has established structures and sentiments that have made Europeans less likely to go to war against each other, and a Europe at peace is itself a precious thing. Whether a supranational structure over democratic polities is necessary to prevent war against them, however, is a bit of a stretch, and insofar as that supranational structure thwarts democracy, it may even be counterproductive for peace.

That leads us to the final aspect of commentary on this year's Peace Prize, which is of course the perennial problematic question of the prize itself, and the meaning of peace. The citation written out by Alfred Nobel discussed the importance of the reduction of standing armies, and the elimination of war. In this, the Prize will always seem to possess a bit of a contradiction; the surest times of peace have been eras in which power vacuums are sealed, but trade is freed. How those power vacuums are sealed, however, is usually by  standing armies (or even more likely, navies). The practical Peace Prize bumps up against the idealist's Peace Prize. Europe certainly has reduced its standing armies, but it is foolish to believe that doing so was what caused the (relative) peace in Europe today.